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Losing the Best and the Brightest:
The Disappearing Wage Premium for
H-1B Visa Recipients
ABSTRACT

The pressure for immigration reform in the technology industry
revolves heavily around the use of the H-1B visa, which allows
companies to temporarily hire highly skilled workers. This Note
provides an empirical analysis of the historical wages of H-1B workers
and domestic workers in the technology industry to determine whether
H-1B workers earn more or less than domestic workers in the same
industry. In the technology industry, H-1B workers' wage premium
has eroded in recent years relative to domestic workers, leading to
stagnant wages that may deter the "best and the brightest" from
choosing to enter into the H-1B process. To enhance the H-1B program,
Congress should adopt immigration reform that sets aside a certain
number of visas specifically for the technology industry. Additionally,
this reform should mimic Canada's hybrid system by adopting a
points-based system that gives preference to immigrants with arranged
employment opportunities. Finally, as seen in the success of Canada's
Provincial Nominee Program, the reform should allot these visas to
each state to determine the most effective and efficient allocation of
H-1B visas in the state and allow immigrants to apply directly to each
state.
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If Fabien Beckers' immigration fate was left to the H-1B
program, the United States would have lost Beckers and his
life-saving technology company.' Beckers founded Morpheus Medical,
now Arterys, 2 a company that created the first cardiac diagnostic tool
that provides 3D interactivity, flow, and pressure inside the heart
non-invasively via a ten-minute MRI exam. 3 The company, which
aims to combat cardiovascular disease, has serious life-saving
potential.4 Beckers, a French citizen, obtained his Ph.D. at Cambridge
and arrived in the United States in 2010 to attend Stanford's
Graduate School of Business. 5
After finding business partners,
obtaining money from investors, and finding customers, Beckers had
one last hurdle to conquer before he graduated: he needed an H-1B
visa. 6
Stakes were high. Investors in Morpheus Medical had
conditioned their investments on Beckers finding a way to legally
remain in the United States.7 Beckers's application for an H-1B visa,
a specialty visa for highly skilled immigrants, was denied.8 He
appealed the determination and was again denied.9 Unable to obtain
an H-1B visa and running out of options, Beckers was close to facing

1
See Fabien Beckers, Startups Speak: Immigration and the Innovation Economy,
ENGINE (May 1, 2013), http://engine.is/issues/startups-speak-immigration-and-the-innovationeconomy/191.
2.
See ARTERYS, https://www.arterys.com/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
3

See

Fabien

Beckers,

INNOVATION

MOVEMENT,

.

http://declareinnovation.com/Innovator-of-the-Week/Fabien-Beckers.aspx (last visited Mar. 14,
2015).
4.
See Mission, ARTERYS, https://www.arterys.com/about (last visited Mar. 14, 2015)
(stating that cardiovascular disease, the disease that Arterys aims to combat, is the number one
cause of mortality worldwide); see also Beckers, supra note 1 (referring to Morpheus Medical as a
"life-saving company").
See Beckers, supra note 1.
5.
6.
See id.
7.
See id.
8.
See id. ("When my H-lB application was denied, my appeal failed, and other
avenues were successively closed off. .
See id.
9.
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deportation. 10 By a stroke of luck, Beckers eventually received an 0-1
visa, a three-year "genius" visa that requires an immigrant to be at
the top of their field." However, had it been left to the H-1B program,
the United States would have lost Beckers and the lives that his
technology company would save. 12
The technology industry's demands for highly skilled workers
Amidst concern regarding domestic
remain largely unmet.13
unemployment rates and job creation, four of the largest high-tech
companies in the country-Intel, Microsoft, IBM, and Oracle-had a
combined ten thousand job openings in 2013.14 Some tech employers,
unable to satisfy their demand for highly skilled employees with
domestic workers, look to fill jobs by temporarily employing workers
from overseas. 15 The technology industry relies more on foreign
workers than any other industry, and 61 percent of H-1B visas
approved in 2012 were for computer-related occupations. 16

See id. ("But since I am a French citizen, I faced deportation, and the possibility of
10.
losing the chance to build this life-saving company.").
See Jessica Leber, Silicon Valley Fightsfor Immigrant Talent, MIT TECH. REV. (July
11.
26, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/5 16546/silicon-valley-fights-for-immigranttalent/. For a description of the 0-1 visa, see 0-1 Visa: Individuals with ExtraordinaryAbility or
Achievement, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/working-unitedstates/temporary-workers/o- 1-individuals-extraordinary-ability-or-achievement/o- 1-visa-

individuals-extraordinary-ability-or-achievement (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
See Beckers, supra note 1.
12.
See H.R. REP. No. 106-692, at 15 (2000) (quoting OFFICE OF TECH. POLICY, U.S.
13.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AMERICA'S NEW DEFICIT: THE SHORTAGE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

WORKERS 1 (1997)) ("[T]here is substantial evidence that the United States is having trouble
keeping up with the demand for new information technology workers."); see also Over 100
Leading Tech Executives Urge President Obama and Congress to Enact High-Skilled
Immigration

Reform,

TECHNET

(Mar.

14,

2013),

[hereinafter

Tech

Executiues]

http://www.technet.org/over-100-leading-tech-executives-urge-president-obama-and-congress-toenact-high-skilled-immigration-reform/

(presenting a letter from tech industry executives to

address "the need for more qualified, highly-skilled professionals, domestic and foreign," and
urging the President to enact immigration reform this year).
14.
See Tech Executives, supra note 13 ("Four high-tech companies alone-IBM, Intel,
Microsoft and Oracle-have combined 10,000 openings in the United States.").
See Jeffrey L. Gower, As Dumb as We Wanna Be: U.S. H-1B Visa Policy and the
15.
"BrainBlocking" of Asian Technology Professionals, 12 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 243, 244 (2011)
("[H-1B] visas allow foreign professionals to enter the country for a limited period of time and are
the primary mechanism for entry-level positions in the information technology sector.").
See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
16.
(2013),
2
WORKERS
OCCUPATION
SPECIALTY
HIB
OF
CHARACTERISTICS

http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%2OStudies/H-1lB/hlbfy-12-characteristics.pdf; see also Gower, supra note 15, at 244 ("The information technology
sector disproportionately relies on Hi-B visas compared to other industries."); Neil G. Ruiz et al.,
The Search for Skills: Demand for H-1B Immigrant Workers in U.S. Metropolitan Areas,
BROOKINGS (July 18, 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/07/18-hlb-visaslabor-immigration#overview ("Computer occupations were the most highly requested occupation

group in all but 11 metros of the 106 high-demand metros [among H-1B applications.]").
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The H-1B visa is a legal mechanism for technology employers
to temporarily hire workers from abroad in specialty occupations,1 7 a
term that is defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act.18 Many
jobs in the technology industry qualify as specialty occupations,
including computer programmers and system analysts.1 9 Congress
enacted the H-1B visa program with the intent of helping US
employers who cannot otherwise obtain needed business skills and
abilities from the domestic workforce. 20 To quell concerns of foreign
workers replacing domestic workers, Congress capped the number of
visas that could be distributed every year. 21 The competition for these
visas in the technology industry remains fierce. 2 2 In the first six days
of the 2015 application period, applicants filed almost three times as
many applications as the number of available visas. 23
17.
See Karen Jensen, Note, Barriers to H-1B Visa Sponsorship in the IT Consulting
Industry: The Economic Incentive to Alter H-1B Policy, 35 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1027, 1029 (2012)
("H-1B visas are temporary visas for highly skilled foreign workers that permit employment in a
specialty occupation in the United States.").
18.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(i) (2012). The Immigration and Nationality Act defines a
specialty occupation as "an occupation that requires (A) the theoretical and practical application
of a body of highly specialized knowledge, and (B) attainment of a bachelor's or higher degree in
the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a minimum for entry into the occupation in the United
States." § 1184(i)(1); see also 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A) (2015).
To qualify as a specialty occupation, the position must meet one of the following
criteria: (1) A baccalaureate or higher degree or its equivalent is normally the
minimum requirement for entry into the particular position; (2) The degree
requirement is common to the industry in parallel positions among similar
organizations or, in the alternative, an employer may show that its particular position
is so complex or unique that it can be performed only by an individual with a degree;
(3) The employer normally requires a degree or its equivalent for the position; or (4)
The nature of the specific duties are so specialized and complex that knowledge
required to perform the duties is usually associated with the attainment of a
baccalaureate or higher degree.

8 C.F.R.
19.

§ 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(A)

(2015).

See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 16, at 2 (citing 8 C.F.R.

214.2(h)(4)(ii)) ("Specialty occupations may include, but are not limited to, computer systems
analysts and programmers, physicians, professors, engineers, and accountants.").
20.
H-1B Program, U.S. DEP'T LAB., http://www.dol.gov/whdimmigration/hlb.htm (last
visited Mar. 14, 2015) ("The intent of the H-1B provisions is to help employers who cannot
otherwise obtain needed business skills and abilities from the U.S. workforce by authorizing the
temporary employment of qualified individuals who are not otherwise authorized to work in the
United States.").
21.
See Gower, supra note 15, at 248 ("Once relatively easy to obtain, various political
pressures have reduced the visa quota of non-citizens by two-thirds since 2003.").
22.
See Matt Richtel, Tech Recruiting Clashes with Immigration Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/12/business/12immig.html?pagewanted=all
&_r=0 (noting the intense competition for H-1B visas) ("Since 2004, there has been a growing gap
between the number of H- 1B visas sought and those granted, through a lottery.").
23.
See Press Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., USCIS Reaches FY 2015
Cap (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.uscis.gov/news/uscis-reaches-fy-2015-h-lb-cap (announcing, days
after beginning to accept applications for H-1B visas for fiscal year 2015, a sufficient amount of
applications had been received to meet the statutory cap).
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Scholars are concerned about the wage outcomes of H-1B visa
holders, particularly in the technology industry. 24 However, studies
on the wages of H-1B visa holders find conflicting results. Some
suggest that the high demand for these foreign workers has resulted
in increased wages for H-1B visa recipients. 25 Others report stagnant
wages, which suggests that the industry is simply hoping to capitalize
on a cheap source of highly skilled foreign labor.2 6
Tech industry leaders desire reform of the H-1B process to
ensure the sustainability of the immigration system. 27 In 2008, Bill
Gates stated that if he could change one law in the United States, it
would be the H-1B visa cap. 28 Responding to the tech sector's
concerns, a group of senators recently introduced a bill entitled the
and
Immigration
Opportunity,
Economic
Security,
Border
Modernization Act that proposed comprehensive immigration
reform. 29 Among other changes to the H-1B program, the bill would
immediately increase the H-1B visa cap from 65,000 to 115,000, with

24.
See Eric Markowitz, H-1B Visas: Clever Trick for Cheap Tech Talent?, INC. (July 2,
2013), http://www.inc.com/eric-markowitz/are-hlbs-just-a-clever-trick-for-cheap-labor.html.
For conflicting views on the impact of H-1B workers on domestic wages, compare
25.
Jennifer Hunt, Which Immigrants Are Most Innovative and Entrepreneurial?:Distinctions by
Entry Visa, 29 J. LAB. ECON. 417, 443 (finding that foreign workers who enter into the United
States with a temporary student or work visa earn more than domestic workers), with JOHN
MIANO, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THE BOTTOM OF THE PAY SCALE: WAGES FOR H-1B

COMPUTER PROGRAMMERS 1 (2005), available at http://www.cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/
2005/backl305.pdf ("In spite of the requirement that H-lB workers be paid the prevailing wage,
H-1B workers earn significantly less than their American counterparts.").
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
26.
See Somini Sangupta, Tech Industry Pushes to Amend Immigration Bill, N.Y.
27.
TIMES, May 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/20/technology/tech-industry-pushes-toamend-immigration-bill.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(quoting Michael Moritz, Chairman,
Sequoia Capital) ("America's place will be assured if we can continue to be the magnet for the
smartest and most energetic young people from all over the world. We need to attract them to
the U.S. and keep them here. There's a danger that this sentiment gets lost amidst all the
mindless politicking."). Many large companies within the technology industry have expressed
dissatisfaction with the current H-1B visa process-more specifically, the current caps placed on
the system. Interest groups such as Compete America, backed by many corporations,
universities, research institutions, trade associations, and FWD.us, backed by technology
powerhouses such as Mark Zuckerberg and Bill Gates, have avidly petitioned Congress in
support of comprehensive immigration reform. Compete America advocates for a market-based
H-1B visa cap and credits the pitfalls of the H-lB system to jobs lost in America due to the
shortage of skilled foreign workers. See About .us, FWD.US, http://www.fwd.us/about-us (last
visited Mar. 14, 2015); Who We Are, COMPETE AM., http://www.competeamerica.org/about-us/
(last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
28.
Patrick Thibodeau, Gates to Appear Before Congress on Eve of H-1B Visa Rush,
NETWORKWORLD (Mar. 5, 2008, 12:00 PM), http://www.networkworld.com/article/2284029/datacenter/gates-to-appear-before-congress-on-eve-of-h-lb-visa-rush.html ("'If I could just change one
law in the U.S. it would be this,' Gates said.").
29.
Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,
S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013).
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an upper limit set to 180,000 visas per year. 30 However, the bill's
"good faith" clause requires a company to show that they have put
forth efforts to hire domestic workers to fill the job. 31
This Note explores the implications of the proposed changes to
the H-1B process and engages in an empirical analysis of the
historical wages of H-1B visa holders to determine if these temporary
workers earn a wage premium or garner a wage penalty relative to
their domestic counterparts. Part I discusses the H-1B process in the
context of the technology industry, including an in-depth look at the
proposed legislation and Congressional caps on H-1B visas. 32 Part II
analyzes the current state of the technology industry's labor force and
the supply and demand principles underlying the industry's insistence
on more H-1B visas. 33 Part III provides an empirical analysis of H-1B
workers' wages to determine if they are paid a statistically significant
different salary than their domestic worker counterparts. 34 Part IV
recommends that Congress allow states to control the distribution of
H-1B visas, while abolishing the good faith showing proposed for
obtaining an H-1B visa. 35 Part IV also argues that Congress should
set aside a specific number of visas for particular industries within the
technology industry to address the technology industry's specific need
for highly skilled workers. 36

I. H-1B VISAS IN THE TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
Employers seeking to temporarily hire foreign workers for
37
high-skilled jobs usually proceed through the H-1B visa process.
Qualification for an H-1B visa requires an employer-employee
relationship to exist in a job that qualifies as a specialty occupation
related to the visa holder's degree. 38 The employer must agree to pay
at least the "actual or prevailing wage for [each] occupation,

See id. § 4101(a)(4).
30.
31.
See infra Part II.
32.
See infra Part I.
33.
See infra Part II.
34.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
35.
See infra Part IV.
36.
37.
See Gower, supra note 15, at 244. There do exist a handful of alternatives to the HlB visa. See Brian John Halliday, Note, In Order to Hire the Best Person for the Job, We Have to
Do What?: A Look at the H-1B Visa Program: The Short-Term Solution for Continued American
Competitiveness in the Global High-Technology Marketplace, 11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 33, 6871 (1999).
38.
See Understanding H-1B Requirements, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/eir/visa-guide/h-lb-specialty-occupation/understanding-h-1b-requirements
(last visited Mar. 14, 2015) (noting the wage requirement as "Requirement 4").
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whichever is higher." 39 Should an applicant and their employer meet
these requirements, they are eligible to apply for a H-1B visa. 40
Successful applicants must proceed through a lottery process to obtain
a visa.4 1 A lottery for H-1B visas has been in place since the demand
for these visas exceeded the statutorily mandated cap placed on the
amount of visas available. 42
In practice, employers may apply for applications in early
43
US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) began
April.
accepting applications for H-1B visas for the 2015 fiscal year on April
1, 2015.44 Since the enactment of the H-1B visa program in the
Immigration Act of 1990,45 the demand for these visas has consistently
exceeded the supply. 4 6 As enacted, the H-1B visa program capped the
amount of H-1B visas issued annually at the current cap, 65,000.47

However, these caps left the technology industry with an
insatiable demand for highly skilled workers in the 1990s. 4 8 In
response to these demands, Congress enacted the American
Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998, which
raised the number of H-1B visas from 65,000 to 115,000 for 1999 to
2000, and to 107,500 for 2001.49 Congress expected the Act to be only
a short-term fix, but was quickly convinced that the technology

Id.
39.
40.
See id.
41.
See Richtel, supra note 22.
See id.
42.
See Press Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., USCIS Will Accept H-1B
43.
Petitions for Fiscal Year 2016 Beginning April 1, 2015 (Mar. 12, 2015), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/news/uscis-will-accept-h-lb-petitions-fiscal-year-2016-beginning-april-12015 (stating the agency will begin accepting H-1B petitions that are subject to the FY 2016 cap
on April 1, 2015).
Id.
44.
See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978; Courtney L.
45.
Cromwell, Note, Friend or Foe of the U.S. Labor Market: Why Congress Should Raise or
Eliminate the H-1B Visa Cap, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 455, 459-60 (2009) (discussing
the enactment of the H-lB program).
See Ruiz et al., supra note 16. The graphs that chart "Demand Over Time" show the
46.
demand for H-1B visas far exceeded the number of visas issued from 2001 to 2011. Id.
See Cromwell, supra note 45, at 460 ("The protections implemented for the domestic
47.
workforce included capping the amount of H-1B visas issued annually at 65,000 (subject to
increases by Congress) . . . .").
48.
See Christopher Fulmer, Note, A Critical Look at the H-1B Visa Program and Its
Effects on U.S. and Foreign Workers: A Controversial Program Unhinged From its Original
Intent, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823, 833 (2009) ("During the 1990s, IT industry leaders grew
concerned over a shortage of skilled workers, citing studies that found a dwindling number of
U.S. college graduates in computer science, widespread job vacancies, and other signs that
demand was outstripping supply at an alarming rate.").

See id.; see also American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998,
49.
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681.
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industry faced a continuing labor shortage.50 Congress again took
action when it passed the American Competitiveness in the
Twenty-First Century Act of 2000, which raised the cap on H-1B visas
to 195,000 for 2001 to 2003.51 Since 2004, the cap has hovered around

65,000 with an allowance of 20,000 additional H-1B visas for those
individuals who hold advanced degrees from a US university. 52
The historical caps enacted by Congress are largely reactionary
to the technology industry's lobbying for an increased cap. 5 3 While
many hoped that the technology industry's need for foreign workers
would decrease due to the amount of domestic college students
graduating with computer or technology degrees, the industry's cries
for an increased cap have only grown stronger. 54 The push and pull
between Congress and the technology industry will only cease with
comprehensive immigration reform.5 5 Without this, the industry's
high-skilled labor needs will remain unmet.
II. ISSUES UNDERLYING THE H-1B VISA DEBATE

A. The ProposedLegislation:A Good Faith Showing
The Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration
Modernization Act was introduced into the Senate on April 16, 2013.56
The bill, which passed the Senate by a 68-32 vote on June 27, 2013,
proposes sweeping changes to the structure of our immigration

50.
See Fulmer, supra note 48, at 833.
51.
See id.; see also American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-313, 114 Stat. 1251.
52.
See Jill H. Wilson, Immigration Facts: Temporary Foreign Workers, BROOKINGS
(June 18, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/06/18-temporary-workerswilson (noting the cap in the graph "Temporary Worker Visas Issued").
53.
See Norman Matloff, On the Need for Reform of the H-1B Non-Immigrant Work Visa
in Computer-Related Occupations, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 815, 822-24 (2003) ("Moreover,
throughout the latter half of the 1990's [sic], both major political parties had been anxious to
curry favor with the high-tech industry, which they considered a large untapped source of
campaign funding, especially in 'soft money,' i.e. donations to parties, which had no legal limit.").
54.
See Darrell M. West, H-lB Visa Caps Show Need for Immigration Reform,
BROOKINGS (Apr. 16, 2014, 7:30 AM), http://www.brookings.edulblogs/techtank/posts/2014/04/16hlb-visa-immigration-reform-west (noting the "shortage of IT workers and the limited supply of
H-1B visas").
55.
See id.
56.
Major
Actions:
S.744-113th
Congress
(2013-2014),
CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.govfbill/113th-congress/senate-bill/744/actions (last visited Mar. 24, 2015);
see also Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744,
113th Cong. (2013).
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system.5 7 The main provision requires employers to have taken "good
faith steps" to recruit domestic workers for the position for which the
H-1B visa is sought.58 The bill also requires employers to post the job
opening on a website maintained by the US Department of Labor
(DOL). 5 9 H-1B dependent employers 6 0 are further required to offer the
job to "any United States worker who applies and is equally or better
qualified for the job for which the nonimmigrant or nonimmigrants is
or are sought."6 1
The good faith requirement was met with contentious
Senator Chuck
opposition in the Senate Judiciary Committee. 62
Grassley, an avid opponent of the H-1B visa process, proposed an
amendment that required all employers, not just H-1B dependent
employers, to make a good faith showing as provided by the statute. 63
However, many opponents of protectionist measures in the visa
process felt that the good faith effort went too far, and the amendment
failed by a wide margin. 64 The tension in the Senate surrounding the
good faith requirement suggests that it will be a major sticking point
in the House. 65 Because the good faith requirement was described as
57.
See Major Actions: S. 744-113th Congress (2013-2014), supra note 56. On December
10, 2014, the Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on the bill but the bill has yet to pass in
the House. See id.
See S. 744 § 4211. This provision reads, in relevant part:
58.
(2) RECRUITMENT.-...
(G) An employer, prior to filing the application(i) has taken good faith steps to recruit United States workers . . . using procedures
that meet industry-wide standards and offering compensation that is at least as
great as that required to be offered to H-1B nonimmigrants under subparagraph
(A);
(ii) has advertised the job on an Internet website maintained by the Secretary of
Labor for the purpose of such advertising; and
(iii) if the employer is an H-1B skilled worker dependent employer, has offered the
job to any United States worker who applies and is equally or better qualified for
the job for which the non-immigrant or nonimmigrants is or are sought.
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. § 4231.
59.
60.
"An employer is considered H-1B-dependent if it has: 25 or fewer full-time
equivalent employees and at least eight H-lB nonimmigrant workers; or 26-50 full-time
equivalent employees and at least 13 H-1B nonimmigrant workers; or 51 or more full-time
equivalent employees of whoml5 percent [sic] or more are H-1B nonimmigrant workers." U.S.
WAGE & LABOR DiV., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #62C: WHO IS AN H-1B DEPENDENT
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/FactSheet62/
(2008),
available at
EMPLOYER?
whdfs62C.pdf.
61.
S. 744 § 4211.
See Patrick Thibodeau, Senators Begin Contentious H-1B Battle, COMPUTERWORLD
62.
(May 15, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2497436/technology-lawregulation/senators-begin-contentious-h- lb-battle.html.
63.
See id.
64.
See id.
See id.
65.
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a "deal breaker" with the potential of sinking the entire bill, the good
faith requirement and the lesser requirements that apply to all H-1B
employers should be considered separately from the H-1B immigration
bill.6 6 If these requirements are included, they may cause the entire
edifice of immigration reform to crumble.6 7
The technology industry also vigorously opposes the good faith
requirement. 68 Many within the technology industry believe that the
requirement will create an unnecessary administrative burden and
will make it harder for employers to use H-1B visas, should they
Further, a good faith showing sorely lacks an
obtain them. 69
enforcement mechanism.7 0 The bill does not highlight any specific
administrative procedures for companies to follow while proving their
good faith effort, which leaves one wondering if this will be enforced at
all.7 1

Before incorporating

the good faith requirement

into the

proposed legislation, Congress should consider the potential of this
provision to hinder immigration reform. 72
The good faith provision attempts to shore up any claims of
discrimination on behalf of domestic workers. 73
However, the
provision, which only requires employers to consider domestic workers
in the hiring process, fails to consider other adverse employment
actions that may befall domestic workers due to preference for H-1B
employees. 74 While it is illegal to fire a domestic employee to hire a
H-1B employee, H-1B opponents often present anecdotal evidence

66.
67.

See id.
See id.

68.

See Sangupta, supra note 27.

69.
See id.; see also Fedricka Shouten, Deal Eases Some Hiring Restrictions for U.S.
Tech Workers, USA TODAY, May 21, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/
2013/05/21/hatch-schumer-immigration-deal-technology-h-lb-visas/2346741/ ("AFL-CIO officials
charged that the Republican's measures would 'undercut protections for both aspiring citizens
and U.S. workers."').
70.
See Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,
S. 744, 113th Cong. § 4211(c)(2) (2013) (stating that an employer, prior to filing the H-1B
application must have "taken good faith steps to recruit United States workers," without
defining the term "good faith," the employer also must use "procedures that meet industry-wide
standards," and no enforcement mechanism to these provisions is offered).
71.

See supra note 70 and accompanying text.

72.
See Thibodeau, supra note 62.
73.
See Press Release, Senator Chuck Grassley, Grassley Works to Eliminate Fraud and
Abuse from H-1B Visa Program (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/newsreleases/grassley-works-eliminate-fraud-and-abuse-h-lb-visa-program-0
("'When
times are
tough, like they are now, it's especially important that Americans get every consideration before
an employer looks to hire from abroad,' Grassley said. 'The legislation will benefit the American
worker, while still ensuring that U.S. companies get the specialized workers they need."').
See S. 744 § 4211.
74.
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suggesting that this practice is far too common in technology firms. 5
The good faith provisions for both H-lB dependent employers and
other H-1B employers are ineffective in providing a safe harbor from
claims of discrimination by domestic workers and ultimately provide
more unnecessary red tape for employers looking for temporary
workers. The good faith provisions of the bill should only be mandated
for H-1B dependent employers and no other showing should be
required for other H-1B employers.
B. EducationalStructure Overhaul
Underlying the debate on the H-1B program are views on the
sufficiency of the US educational system to train new workers,
particularly in the science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM)
fields.7 6 While many institutions of higher education placed emphasis
on STEM fields in recent years, a recent US Census report stated that
75 percent of US citizens with STEM degrees are not working in that
field.77 Meanwhile, a prominent economic study on H-1B visas showed
that immigrant scientists and engineers accounted for more than half
of the net increase in the US science and engineering labor force since
1995.78 Reports with similar findings have prompted backlash in the
House, where representatives voiced concern over the current
proposed immigration reform bill allowing for too many H-1B visas
when US citizens were passed up for jobs that were given to foreign
workers. 79 Yet this explanation seems incomplete, as there continues

See Thibodeau, supra note 62. For example, Senator Diane Feinstein expressed
75.
concerns through this anecdote:
A while back I met with a group of workers in San Diego, interestingly enough they,
were all above the age of 50 . . . . They'd all been replaced by H-lB workers, and you
saw it clearly. They were traditional engineers; the technology had moved on. What
was seen to be desirable was the young, flexible, highly qualified techie, generally
Asian in Californian, and I felt very badly for these people.
Id. (quoting Senator Diane Feinstein).
76.
See Peter H. Schuck & John E. Tyler, Making the Case for Changing U.S. Policy
Regarding Highly Skilled Immigrants, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 327, 330 (2010) ("[There is] a
supply shortage being created by an aging STEM population and not enough native STEM
graduates.").

77.
See Wesley Robinson, Most with College STEM Degrees Go to Work in Other Fields,
Survey Finds, WASH. POST, July 10, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/localleducation/mostwith-college-stem-degrees-go-to-other-fields-of-work/2014/07/10/9aede466-084d-1 1e4-bbflcc51275e7f8fstory.html.
78.
See William R. Kerr & William F. Lincoln, The Supply Side of Innovation: H-1B
Visa Reforms and U.S. Ethnic Invention, 28 J. LAB. ECON. 473, 473-74 (2010).
79.
See Ramsey Cox, Sessions Criticizes Gates's Call for Visas amid Microsoft Layoffs,
HILL (July 17, 2014, 4:11 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/212599-sessions-teasesgates-call-for-immigrant-workers-yet-lays-off- 18k.
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to be ten thousand job openings in four of the largest tech companies.8 0
The tension between the lack of STEM graduates pursuing technology
jobs and the need for H-lB workers is mounting, and immigration
reform must address these issues.
The calls for a strengthened domestic educational system and a
more liberal H-1B program are often made in tandem.8 1 These two
missions seem to complement each other: First, strengthen the
educational system so that domestic workers can fill highly skilled
technology positions and then, use the H-1B program to fill any gaps. 82
However, the problem with this rationale is that the H-1B program
has been around for more than two decades and technology firms are
still relying heavily on the program to supply a highly skilled work
force. 83 This is contrary to the program's original intent of eventually
weaning the United States off temporary foreign workers as domestic
workers become superiorly skilled.84 On the other side of the debate,
studies have found that restricting the number of H-1B visas can
disproportionately discourage high-ability international students from
pursuing their education in the United States, implying that a
restrictive H-1B policy consequently weakens the pool of
undergraduate students graduating from our domestic universities.8 5
Directed immigration reform will have to balance the presentation of
opportunities for highly skilled foreign workers while continuing to
promote the necessary infrastructure to train domestic workers to
eventually fill their positions. 86

80.
Tech Executives, supra note 13.
81.
See Bill Gates, How to Keep America Competitive, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/23/AR2007022301697.html
("Two steps are critical. First, we must demand strong schools so that young Americans enter the

&

workforce with the math, science and problem-solving skills they need to succeed in the
knowledge economy. We must also make it easier for foreign-born scientists and engineers to
work for U.S. companies.").
See id.
82.
See Cox, supra note 79.
83.
See Fulmer, supra note 48, at 825 (quoting Secretary of Labor Robert Reich)
84.
("[W]hat was conceived as a means to meet temporary business needs for unique, highly skilled
professionals from abroad is, in fact, being used by some employers to bring in relatively large
numbers of foreign workers who may well be displacing U.S. workers and eroding employers'
commitment to the domestic workforce.").
See Takao Kato & Chad Sparber, Quotas and Quality: The Effect of H-1B Visa
85.
Restrictions on the Pool of Prospective UndergraduateStudents from Abroad, 95 REV. ECON.
STAT. 109, 109 (2013).
See id.
86.
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C. Wage and Age Discriminationin the H-lB Visa Program
The H-1B program also raises significant questions about labor
participation and compensation among both foreign and domestic
workers.87 Several economic studies have looked at the compensation
of H-1B visa holders relative to domestic workers, but their findings
are inconsistent.8 8 Contrary to the popular belief that foreign workers
are a cheap source of labor for US firms, Mithas and Lucas find that
non-US citizen information technology (IT) professionals earn a
significantly higher wage than domestic IT workers, suggesting that
foreign IT professionals and domestic workers are complements.8 9 The
study also found some evidence that restrictive visa policies and lower
visa caps result in higher salary premiums for those with a work
visa. 90
Other studies have found that H-1B visas benefit the
companies who employ them.9 1
Through the H-1B program, foreign workers are statutorily
protected from inequality in wages. 92 When filing an H-1B application
with the DOL, employers must pay the "required wage" to the H-1B
worker for the duration of that worker's "authorized period of stay."93

After filling out their Labor Condition Application (LCA), employers
are required to pay the higher of the offered wage for the position or
the prevailing wage for that position, as determined externally by the
DOL. 9 4 The DOL's Wage and Hour Division enforces the H-1B wage
provisions and has the authority, after an opportunity for a hearing, to
order the employer to pay the required wage rate.9 5 However, the
87.
See Sunil Mithas & Henry C. Lucas, Jr., Are Foreign IT Workers Cheaper? U.S. Visa
Policies and Compensation of Information Technology Professionals, 56 MGMT. SCI. 745, 745
(2010).
88.
Compare Mithas & Lucas, supra note 87 (finding that foreign IT professionals earn
a wage premium after controlling for human capital attributes), with MIANO, supra note 25
(finding that H-lB workers earn significantly less than their domestic worker counterparts).
See Mithas & Lucas, supra note 87, at 760.
89.
See id.
90.
91.
See Michael A. Clemens, Why Do Programmers Earn More in Houston than
Hyderabad?: Evidence from Randomized Processing of US Visas, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 198, 201
(2013) ("The results suggest that, in this setting, the large majority of workers' value arises from
location alone.").
92.
See Sabrina Underwood, Note, Achieving the American Daydream: The Social,
Economic, and Political Inequalities Experienced by Temporary Workers Under the H-1B Visa
Program, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 727, 737 (2001) ("H-1B workers are protected from inequality in
wages by the provisions and regulations in the H-1B, although some criticize the federal agencies
for failure to enforce the regulations.").
See 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(4)(iii)(B)(2) (2015).
93.
94.
See U.S. WAGE & LABOR DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #62U: WHAT IS THE
WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION'S ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY UNDER THE H-1B PROGRAM? (2008),

available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/FactSheet62/whdfs62U.pdf.
95.
See id.
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Wage and Hour Division may only initiate H-1B-related investigations
through four limited mechanisms: a direct "complaint from an
aggrieved person or organization;" through "specific credible
information from a reliable source;" a "random investigation" for
repeat "willful" violators; or when "[t]he Secretary of Labor has
reasonable cause to believe that the employer is not in compliance."9 6
Therefore, protections for H-1B workers are toothless and fail to
prevent wage discrimination.
Violations of wage requirements are rare, but do occur. 97
Recently, an Indianapolis-based healthcare recruiting and staffing
company was charged with violating several H-1B wage obligations. 98
Among other charges, the company failed to pay the prevailing wage
rate to the H-1B visa recipients.99 The company was ordered to pay
$81,454 in civil money penalties and almost $40,000 in back wages to
six employees in violation of the H-1B wage regulations. 100 The order
also barred the company from participating in the H-1B program for
one year and will be subject to a records review by the DOL for a
two-year period.10 1 On rare occasions, criminal charges may occur due
to H-1B wage-related violations. 102 In 2009, an IT firm was indicted
on ten federal counts, including conspiracy and mail fraud, after
allegedly using fraudulent documents to bring H-1B workers to the
United States.
One critic of the H-1B visa program has noted two ways that
an H-1B employer can abuse the system to save money in labor
costS. 10 3 "Type I savings occur when the employer pays an H-1B
worker less than the norm for comparable American workers, while
"Type II" savings occur when an H-1B employer decides to hire a

Id.
96.
97.
See Nicole Brooks, Beware of H-1B Wage Law Violations: Company to be Debarred,
Ordered to Pay Over $120,000 in Penalties and Back Pay for H-1B/LCA Violations, MARTINDALE,
see also
Aug. 4, 2014, http://www.martindale.com/administrative-law/article2174862.htm;
Jung S. Hahm, Note, American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998:
Balancing Economic and Labor Interests Under the New H-1B Visa Program, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1673, 1698 (1999) ("Despite the large potential benefit of the H-1B visa program for the U.S.
economy, the program also has proven fertile grounds for potential abuses by H-1B employers
against both domestic workforce and foreign IT workers on temporary H-1B visas.").
98.
See Brooks, supra note 97.
99.
See id.
100.
See id.
101.
See id.
102.
See Moira Herbst, Visa Fraud Sparks Arrests Nationwide, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 13,
2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2009-02-13/visa-fraud-sparks-arrests-nationwide
businessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice
(reporting an ongoing federal
probe into H-1B visa fraud led to thirteen arrests and the indictment of IT services firm Vision
Systems Group).
103.
See Matloff, supra note 53, at 816.
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young H-1B worker in lieu of an older American worker. 104 "Type I"
savings amount to wage discrimination against H-1B workers, while
"Type II" savings could amount to age discrimination against domestic
workers.10 5 Though most H-1B workers are under the age of thirty, an
age discrimination argument holds less weight when applied to the
technology industry, where younger workers, regardless if they are
American or not, generally already have a competitive advantage
because they were programming or using technology at an earlier
age. 106 However, this "ageism" in the technology sector is cause for
concern of discrimination, and this worry is not confined to the H-1B
program.1 07 Though older workers can have the same necessary skills
as younger workers, there are other reasons, such as a lack of demand
for high wages and benefits and less familial commitments, why the
industry may prefer younger workers.1 08 Should H-1B employers be
seeking to abuse the system, "Type I" savings are the most likely to
occur.109 The proceeding empirical analysis seeks to determine if
"Type I" savings are actually present in the technology industry.1 1 0
III. DATA AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Theoretical Framework
Economic studies suggest that the wages of both American
workers and H-1B visa recipients are determined by the aggregate
supply and demand of both foreign and domestic technology workers
and whether these two groups complement or substitute each other.'
Foreign and domestic workers will be substitutes if employers are
indifferent between the two groups of workers. 112 These groups are
complements if hiring a worker from one group increases the demand
for a worker in the other group.1 13
Legislators who passed the American Competitiveness and
Workforce Improvement Act of 1998 rejected the notion that H-1B and
domestic workers are substitutes and instead focused on the
104.
See id.
See id.
105.
106.
See id.
107.
See Verne Koptyoff, Tech Industry Job Ads: Older Workers Need Not Apply,
FORTUNE (June 19, 2014, 10:45 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/06/19/tech-job-ads-discrimination/
("Critics have long accused the technology industry of ageism.").
108.
See id.
See MIANO, supra note 25, at 6.
109.
See infra Part III.
110.
111.
See Mithas & Lucas, supra note 87, at 748.
112.
See id.
See id.
113.
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possibility of job creation by expanding the H-1B program. 114 The
Senate acknowledged the complementary nature of the groups, stating
"there is a fixed number of jobs and competition for which is a
zero-sum game."115 The lack of data showing a correlation between
the percentage of foreign workers in a particular occupation and
unemployment rates in the same occupation was particularly
convincing to the legislature.1 1 6 An economic study that found that
H-1B workers contribute to the productivity of American firms and
generate jobs for American workers recently confirmed this
The study, which focused on Indian computer
approach.11 7
programmers, found that foreign programmers are far more valuable
to US employers when they are in the United States than when they
are in India, which is evidence that the cap is inhibiting economically
useful transactions.11 8
Similarly, there is extensive empirical literature that aims to
determine whether certain groups earn a pay premium or pay
penalty. 119 A pay premium results when the labor demand exceeds
the labor supply for that labor market, causing scarcity. 120 A pay
penalty occurs when there exists an excess of labor supply relative to
labor demand or other factors, such as discrimination, suppressing the
wages of workers. 121 Should the two groups act as substitutes, an
increase in the labor demand for immigrant workers will depress the
labor demand of other workers, causing immigrant workers to earn a
pay premium. 122 The reverse is also true. 123 There is no consensus on
the impact of H-1B visas on domestic worker's wages. 124
114.
See Fulmer, supra note 48, at 826.
Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 105-186, at 13 (1998)).
115.
See Fulmer, supra note 48, at 826.
116.
See Clemens, supra note 91, at 201.
117.
Id.
118.
See, e.g., Joni Hersch, Skin Color Discrimination and Immigrant Pay, 58 EMORY
119.
L.J. 357, 357 (2008); Olof Aslund & Lena Hensvik, Seeking Similarity: How Immigrants and
Natives Manage in the Labor Market, 32 J. LAB. ECON. 405, 425 (2014).
See Mithas & Lucas, supra note 87, at 748-49.
120.
121.
See Hersch, supra note 119, at 357 ("Discrimination is a residual inference drawn
after taking into account legitimate productivity-related characteristics. Pay disparities between
groups of workers that remain after taking such characteristics into account in the regression
analysis are frequently attributed to discrimination.").
See Mithas & Lucas, supra note 87, at 748-49.
122.
123.
See id.
124.

MAGNUS LOFSTROM & JOSEPH HAYES, H-1BS: How Do THEY STACK UP TO US BORN

WORKERS? 2 (2011), available at http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:101:1-201203016393
(discussing the lack of individual level data in several economic studies and potential
inaccuracies that could stem from this lack of data). Researchers have competing views on HIB's impact on wages. See Kerr & Lincoln, supra note 78, at 7 n.9 ("Studies of the impact of H1Bs on visas are mixed."). Compare Hunt, supra note 25, at 443 (finding that foreign workers
who enter the United States with a temporary student or worker visa earn more than domestic
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Should H-1B visa holders earn significantly less than their
domestic counterparts in similar jobs, it is likely that either the supply
for these temporary workers is too great or they are experiencing some
sort of discrimination that will push down their wages. 125 The sheer
number of applications from companies requesting H-1B visas
suggests that the former is unlikely. 126 Therefore, should H-1B
holders experience a pay penalty, discrimination, rather than an
excess of supply, may be inferred as the source. 127 There also may be
differences in other characteristics in the data, such as language
proficiency or cultural familiarity, if relevant, that are not available in
the data. The lower relative pay may also be discouraging highly
skilled foreign workers from applying to the H-1B program, which
leads to a workforce that is significantly less skilled, in which case the
pay gap is not due to discrimination.
B. Labor ConditionApplication Data and Process
Prior research on the H-1B visa program is primarily
descriptive due to data constraints and limitations. 1 28 However, to
inform the empirical analysis, this study uses the DOL's Office of
Foreign Labor Certification (OFLC) online database, which maintains
micro-data with individually specified data for each Labor Condition
Application (LCA). 129 Each LCA, which is a portion of the H-1B
application, stipulates the required wage levels and working
conditions that the sponsoring employer guarantees for the H-1B

workers), and Mithas & Lucas, supra note 87, at 748-49 (finding that foreign IT professionals
earn a salary premium when compared to IT workers with US citizenship), with Matloff, supra
note 53, at 822-24 (citing many studies stating that an employer will pay H-1B workers less
than Americans with the same qualifications), and MIANO, supra note 25 ("[I]n spite of the
requirement that H-1B workers be paid the prevailing wage, H-1B workers earn significantly
less than their American counterparts.").

125.
See Mithas & Lucas, supra note 87, at 748-49; see also Hersch, supra note 119, at
357.
See Press Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., supra note 23 (stating
126.
that within ten days, the USCIS received 172,500 applications, a number exceeding the visa cap
by almost three times).
127.
See Underwood, supra note 92, at 727 (suggesting discrimination is at play with the
H-1B visa program).
128.
See Kerr & Lincoln, supra note 78, at 484 (noting issues with obtaining estimates of
H-1B entry rates and population stocks, two measures which are not definitively known). To
obtain a good estimate on entry rates and population stocks, see B. Lindsay Lowell, H-1B

Temporary Workers: Estimating the Population (Ctr. for Comparative Immigration Studies,
12, 2000), available at http://ccis.ucsd.edulwp-content/uploads/
Working Paper No.
2012/08/wrkgl2.pdf.
U.S.
DEP'T
LAB.,
OFLC
Performance
Data,
129.
See
http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
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worker.1 30 The database, which is updated each fiscal year, contains a
comprehensive record of each employer who submitted an LCA
applicationI in conjunction with their H-1B visa, their industry code
as reported by the North American Industrial Classification System
(NAICS), and whether the application was denied, withdrawn, or
certified.1 32 An important advantage of the LCA data is that it
measures latent demand for H-1B visas, as all applications are
reported regardless of whether the H-1B visa is ultimately granted.1 33
The LCA micro-data includes valuable parameters to obtain
wage information on H-1B visa holders, such as the employer's
proposed wage and the industry prevailing wage for this type of job.1 34
The industry prevailing wage is not self-reported and is determined
externally, usually by the State Economic Security Agency operating
in each state. 135 The database also reports the 2010 Standard
Occupational Classification (SOC) code for each job, which classifies
workers by occupational categories. 136 Occupations may differ from
industries, and occupations are often more closely linked to what an

130.
See Anthony F. Silato & Scott R. Malyk, Harsh Rulings Against H-1B Employers for
LCA
Violations,
AM.
B.
AS'N
(Sept.
25,
2012),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/employment/emaillsummer20l2/summer2Ol20912-harsh-rulings-against-hlb-employers-1ca-violations.html.
[T1he LCA is an attestation to the Department of Labor (DOL) that: (i) The working
conditions for the foreign national will be identical to those of U.S. workers; (ii) the
salary will equal either the prevailing wage in the area of employment or match the
actual wage being paid to others similarly employed by the employer, whichever is
greater ....
Id. For the actual LCA, see U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR CONDITION APPLICATION FOR H-1B NONIMMIGRANTS, available at http://www.doleta.gov/regions/REGO5/Documents/eta-9035.pdf.

To proceed though the H-1B visa application process, an LCA application must be
131.
certified. However, this does not mean that the H-1B application will be granted, as additional
paperwork is required for the H-1B application. See Halliday, supra note 37, at 43 ("Once the
U.S. employer has properly determined the prevailing wage for the specialty occupation in
question, and has obtained a certified LCA from the DOL, the employer is in a position to
prepare and file the actual H-lB petition with the INS."). Once a sponsoring company submits
their application, USCIS officers compare the actual wage stated on the application to the
prevailing wage for the position as determined by various guidance from the DOL. See Sarah
Jain, Note, Looking to the North While Playing Doctor: Solving the H-1B Visa Problem by
Following Canada'sLead, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 433, 439-40 (2001).
See OFLC PerformanceData, supra note 129.
132.
See Kerr & Lincoln, supra note 78, at 487.
133.
134.

See

H-1B Program Database, FOREIGN

LAB.

CERTIFICATION

DATA

CENTER,

http://www.flcdatacenter.com/CaseHlB.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2015) (describing the different
fields contained within the data).
135.
See id.
136.
See H-1B iCert LCA, U.S. DEP'T LAB., http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/
docs/1ca/LCARecordLayoutFY13.doc (last visited Mar. 17, 2015) (noting for each field name
the description of the field); see also Standard Occupational Classification, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
http://www.bls.gov/soc/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
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individual earns. 137 Industry classifications are based on the type of
activity at an individual's work, while an occupation is the kind of
work a person does to earn a living.13 8 Individuals are sorted into
industries based on the SOC code, rather than the NAICS code, for
each individual's job because certain workers may be hired into
technology companies but not perform technology work, such as
performing administrative or management work instead. 139 As a
result of using the SOC code to dictate whether the individual is in a
technology occupation, this study captures only those who perform
technical work.1 40 Additionally, this study restricts the sample to only
H-1B visa seekers. 141
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for H-1B LCA
applications for each year. All wage information is reported in 2013
dollars.
Table 1. LCA Statistics
2013 H-1B LCA Application Data
Total Number of
Applications Filed
Percentage of Applications

420,385
86%

Certified
Percentage of H-lB
Recipients in the
Technology Industry
Mean Hourly Wage of all
H-lB Recipients
Mean Hourly Wage of All
H-1B Recipients in the
Technology Industry

137.

64%

$39.83
$38.87

See Mike Walden, Occupation vs. Industry, N.C. ST. U. (Nov. 3, 2006, 8:35 AM),

http://www.ncsu.edu/project/calscommblogs/economic/archives/2006/11/occupation-vs-i.html.

138.
See id.
139.
See Leslie J. Pollack et al., A Common Language for Classifying and Describing
Occupations: The Development, Structure, and Application of the Standard Occupational
Classification, 41 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 297, 297 (2002).
140.
See id.
141.
The LCA micro-data also includes information on individuals seeking to obtain an
H-2B visa, or specific H-1B visas from Singapore and Chile, for example. This study only seeks to
capture those visas that will be affected by the H-1B visa cap, and therefore drops all
observations that are not traditional H-1B visas. See H-1B iCert LCA, supra note 136.
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Mean Hourly Wage of
H-i B Tech Workers in
Silicon Valley

$45.94

Percentage of Employer
Wages Higher than the
Industry Prevailing Wage
Percentage of Employer
Wages Higher than the
Industry Prevailing Wage in
the Technology Industry

76%
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77%

As detailed in the LCA micro-data, the number of applications
far exceeded the 2013 statutory cap on H-1B visas by a factor of
almost 6.5.142 The bulk of applications, 86 percent, were certified and
proceeded to the next step of the process. 143 While H-1B applicants in
the technology industry earn a slightly lower wage than the average
H-1B applicant, H-1B tech applicants in Silicon Valley earn a
significantly higher wage than the average H-1B applicant. 144 More
than three-fourths of employers, including 77 percent of employers
within the technology industry, paid a higher wage than the industry
at large, which suggests that H-1B workers earn a pay premium
compared to domestic workers. 145
C. The National Survey of College Graduates
In addition to the LCA micro-data, this study utilizes the
National Survey of College Graduates (NSCG), a nationally
representative
survey conducted
by the National
Science
Foundation. 146 This study utilizes the two most recent publicly
available waves of the NSCG, which surveyed individuals in 2010 and
2003.147 The 2010 survey is a stratified random sample of respondents
to both the American Community Survey and the 2008 NSCG who
reported having a bachelor's degree or higher. 148 The 2003 NSCG is a

&

142.
The statutory cap in 2013 was 65,000. See Press Release, U.S. Citizenship
Immigration Servs., USCIS Reaches Fiscal Year 2013 H-1B Cap (June 12, 2012),
http://www.uscis.gov/news/uscis-reaches-fiscal-year-2013-h-lb-cap.
143.
See supra Table 1.
144.
See supra Table 1.
145.
See supra Table 1.
146.
See
National Survey
of
College
Graduates, NAT'L
Scl.
FOUND.,
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/srvygrads/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
Id.
147.
148.
Id. ("The 2010 NSCG incorporated a dual frame sample design where it selected a
portion of its sample from the 2009 American Community Survey respondents who indicated
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stratified random sample of respondents to the 2000 Census who
Respondents
reported having a bachelor's degree or higher. 149
currently reside in the United States and are under the age of
seventy-six. 1 0 In addition to its large sample size, the NSCG is of
particular use to this study because it surveys individuals that have
the potential to fill the high-skilled jobs that are currently occupied by
H-1B visa holders.15 1
Individuals surveyed through the NSCG who indicate that they
are not a US citizen are asked if they have a temporary visa, and if so,
if the visa is for work, for study or training, or is a dependent visa. 152
While the survey does not distinguish between H-1B visas and other
temporary work visas, H-1B visas are one of the most popular types of
work visas, and notably, H-1B visas are listed first among the
different types of work visas listed in the NSCG survey. 153 For
purposes of empirical study, this Note will refer to all temporary work
visas as H-1B visas.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for each wave of the
NCSG, with wages reported in 2010 dollars. 154
Table 2. Summary Statistics (NCSG)
2003

2010

Total Sample Size

99,650

76,728

Percentage of
Individuals in
Technology Jobs

9.1%

6.9%

they had a bachelor's degree or higher in any field of study. The remaining portion of the
NSCG sample was selected from respondents to the 2008 NSCG.").
Id. ("The 2003 NSCG selected its sample from the 2000 decennial census long
149.
respondents who indicated they had a bachelor's degree or higher in any field of study. The
NSCG survey respondents served as the sample source for future survey cycles within the
decade (i.e., the 2006 and 2008 NSCG).").
Id.
150.
151.
See Hunt, supra note 25, at 10 (noting the NSCG's large sample size).
152.

2010
form
2003
2000

See ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2010 NATIONAL SURVEY

OF COLLEGE GRADUATES 11 (2010), available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/srvygrads/
surveys/srvygrads-newrespond20l0.pdf (question Eli).
153.
See id.; see also H-1B Alternatives: When No H-lBs Are Available, JACKSON LEWIS
(Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewslD=4259 ("H-lB visas are the
most popular employment-based visa for professional workers.").
154.
For this analysis, the study used a restricted sample of those with hourly wages
between two dollars and one thousand dollars. Technology jobs include all computer and
information scientists, computer support specialists, computer system analysts, database
administrators, network and computer systems administrators, network systems and data
communications analysts, other computer information science occupations, and computer

software engineers. See National Survey of College Graduates,supra note 146.
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21.3%

25%

1.3%

1.8%

$85,940

$82,482

$93,143

$89,560

$92,140

$90,296

$84,288

$79,794

$83,874

$92,774

$88,700

$89,251

Temporary Work Visas

Average Total Annual
Income

Average Total Income
of Tech Workers
Average Total Income
of Foreign Born
Workers
Average Total Income
of Domestic Workers
Average Total Income
of Temporary Visa
Workers
Average Total Income
of Temporary Visa Tech
Workers

Though immigrants make up nearly one-quarter of the NSCG
2010 sample, these results are not surprising, as immigrants
represented 24 percent of the US science and engineering workforce
with a bachelor's degree in the 2000 census. 15 5 Though recent
estimates of the percentage of immigrants in the workforce total only
12 percent, the NSCG captures a substantially greater immigrant
population due to the prerequisite that the individual must have
obtained at least a bachelor's degree before being surveyed. 156
After restricting the sample to only those who report a positive
total income, interesting trends emerge in the data. In 2003, H-1B
workers had slightly less total income than domestic workers. 15 7 H-1B
workers in the technology industry earned more than both H-1B
workers not in the technology industry and all domestic workers.' 58 In
2010, H-1B workers earned more than their US-born counterparts by
a significant amount, while H-1B workers in the tech industry earned
slightly less than all H-1B workers.1 59 In 2010, the average salary for

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See Kerr & Lincoln, supra note 78, at 474.
See National Survey of College Graduates, supra note 146.
See supra Table 2.
See supra Table 2.
See supra Table 2.
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tech workers was almost identical to the salary of H-1B tech
workers.160

IV. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS
A. Empirical Specification

In order to determine if H-1B visa holders in fact earn a pay
premium or pay penalty, a multiple regressions analysis was used to
predict wage equations for H-1B visa holders using data available
from the 2010 wave of the NSCG with the goal of identifying a pay
differential holding characteristics constant.
The empirical specification relies on a conventional log wage
equation of the following general form:
Ln(wage)= XpJ1

+ f2

HIB+

i3 techindustry+ P4

H1B*techindustry+ e

(2)

The dependent variable is the log of annual salary.
"X" represents a vector of individual and firm characteristics. The
main coefficient of interest for the purposes of determining the effect
of having an H-1B visa in the technology industry is the coefficient on
the interaction term between H-1B and tech industry, "P4." This
coefficient represents the effect of having an H-1B visa in the
technology industry and the premium for belonging to this
demographic. Each regression controls for variables such as age, sex,
location of firm, race, and education.
B. Results
The 2003 and 2010 regressions present starkly different
results. Table 3 reports the effects on wage of H-1B visas holders in
the technology industry in 2003 while Table 4 reports the same effects
for 2010. In each regression, controls are added to the previous
regression and are used to analyze the effect on the interaction
coefficient of H-1B and technology industry.

160.

See supra Table 2.
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Table 3. Regression Results (2003 NSCG)
(1)
0.026
(0.033)

(2)

(3)

-0.017
(0.034)

-0.041

(0.034)

0.250**
(0.010)

0.160***
(0.009)

Tech * H-1B
Visa

-0.045
(0.048)

R-squared

0.01

(4)
-0.060*
(0.034)

(5)
-0.063*
(0.031)

0.204***
(0.010)

0.204***

(0.009)

0.093***
(0.010)

0.031
(0.048)

0.054
(0.049)

0.109**
(0.047)

0.096***
(0.046)

0.14

0.19

0.36

0.46

Sex, Race

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Age

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Disability

Yes

Yes

Yes

Education

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

H-1B Visa
Tech

Region

Yes

Firm and
Industry
Characteristics

(1)

(2)

0.026

(0.034)

(3)
-0.041

(4)

(5)

-0.060*
(0.034)

-0.063*
(0.031)

H-lB Visa

(0.033)

-0.017
(0.034)

Tech

0.250**
(0.010)

0.160***
(0.009)

0.204***
(0.010)

0.204***

0.093***

(0.009)

(0.010)

Tech * H-lB
Visa

-0.045
(0.048)

0.031

0.054
(0.049)

0.109**
(0.047)

0.096***

(0.048)

R-squared

0.01

0.14

0.19

0.36

0.46

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Sex, Race
Age

-

Disability

-

Education

-

Region

-

Firm and
Industry
Characteristics

-

-

-

-

(0.046)

Yes
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* p<0.10; ** p<0.05, ***p<.01
N=79,771: Coefficients from ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions weighted with survey weights. Log annual salary is the
dependent variable. Standard errors reported in parentheses.
Table 4. Regression Results (2010 NSCG)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

H-1B Visa

0.221***
(0.046)

0.188***
(0.049)

0.148***
(0.050)

0.095**
(0.046)

0.047
(0.042)

Tech

0.268***
(0.020)

0.230***
(0.019)

0.179***
(0.019)

0.173***
(0.016)

0.097***
(0.018)

Tech * H-lB
Visa

-0.202***
(0.058)

-0.121**
(0.059)

-0.107*
(0.060)

-0.001
(0.057)

0.032
(0.052)

R-squared

0.01

0.16

0.22

0.40

0.49

Sex, Race

-

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Age

-

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Disability

-

Yes

Yes

Yes

Education

-

Yes

Yes

Yes

Region

-

Yes

Yes

Firm and
Industry
Characteristics

-

Industry

-

-

Yes

-

-

Yes

*p<0.10; ** p<0.05, ***p<.01
N=59,621: Coefficients from OLS regressions weighted with
survey weights. Log hourly wage is the dependent variable. Standard
errors reported in parentheses.
In 2003, for each equation, the interaction coefficient is positive
and statistically significant. This result shows that the technology
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industry, relative to other industries requiring labor from H-1B visa
holders, pays a wage premium. 161 This indicates a greater need for
H-1B workers or a shortage of qualified workers, which will drive up
the price that firms are willing to pay individuals with the requisite
skills for the job. 16 2 In the final regression, where all demographic and
firm characteristics within the NSCG are controlled for, H-1B
immigrants in the tech industry earn a pay premium of almost 10
percent. 163 However, the same is not true for H-1B recipients that are
not in the technology industry. Those immigrants earn a slight pay
penalty of six log points, or roughly 7 percent less than their domestic
counterparts. 16 4
However, in 2010, the interaction coefficient vacillates from
slightly negative to slightly positive depending on the controls,
indicating that the pay premium that H-1B technology workers
experienced in the past years had diminished by the next wave of the
NSCG. The only consistently significant subsection of the sample is
domestic workers in the technology industry who earn a pay premium
of 10 percent when controlling for each demographic and firm
H-1B recipients in the tech industry receive a
characteristics.
non-significant pay premium in 2010; though the question of whether
they earn a pay premium or penalty is particularly sensitive to the
controls used in each regression, suggesting no effect of being an H-1B
worker in the tech industry relative to other domestic tech workers.
The visa cap in place likely drives the discrepancy between the
2003 and 2010 results. While the visa cap for the fiscal year 2003 was
195,000, the cap quickly reverted back to the current level of 65,000
The
for the fiscal year 2004, which began in October 2003.165
summary statistics for 2003 show that, on average, domestic workers
in the technology industry still earned more than H-1B workers in the
tech industry. 166 Therefore, these results suggest that when faced
with a greater supply of H-1B workers, the pay premium for H-1B
However, after
workers in the tech industry will disappear.
and firm
education
as
such
other
factors
for
controlling

For other examples of a wage premium analysis, see Hersch, supra note 119.
161.
See Mithas & Lucas, supra note 87, at 748.
162.
163Log points, as reported in the regression tables, are easily converted into
magnitudes. See Robert Halvorsen & Raymond Palmquist, The Interpretation of Dummy
Variables in SemilogarithmicEquations, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 474, 474-75 (1980).
164.
See id.
165.
See Mithas & Lucas, supra note 87, at 747 ("The maximum number of new H-1B
visas issued per year had an annual cap of 65,000 from fiscal years 1991 to 1998, 115,000 in 1999
and 2000, 195,000 from 2001 to 2003, and 65,000 there-after.").
166.
See supra Table 2.
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characteristics, the pay premium is very much at play. 16 7 This
suggests that there are certain educational levels and skills that H-1B
workers possessed that proved so valuable that they commanded a pay
premium over domestic workers in 2003.168
There are a few explanations for the disappearance of such a
statistically significant pay premium for H-1B tech workers in 2010
after controlling for various demographic and firm characteristics.
Importantly, the 2010 cap on H-1B visas was more restrictive than the
cap for the 2003 fiscal year, with only 65,000 H-1B recipients allowed
to enter the country in 2010.169 Over the seven-year gap between
survey respondents, Americans may have learned similar skills,
causing demand for H-1B technology workers to subside. However,
anecdotal evidence regarding the American education system's lack of
training in technology careers suggests the opposite. 170
Further, the disappearance of the H-1B worker's pay premium
in 2010 may reflect the quality of immigrants that are coming to the
United States to work in technology firms. Relocation for better job
opportunities often suggests a willingness to take risks because of the
challenges associated with moving to a new location with a different
culture and economic environment.17 1 However, the restrictive H-1B
visa cap only compounds the additional risks associated with
migrating to the United States, as individuals must engage in
the hiring process with a US firm with slim chances of actually
obtaining employment. These institutional barriers may dissuade
high-performing foreign technology workers from applying to US
firms, thus lowering the quality of workers and the wages that they
command.
Finally, the disappearance of the pay premium in 2010 for
H-1B visa recipients may be attributed to a quelling of discrimination
against all H-1B workers. As noted above, the average salary for H1B workers significantly increased from 2003 to 2010.172 The prior
pay penalty that all H-1B workers saw could likely be attributed to
discrimination, as they earned lower wages than most of their
167.
See supra Table 3.
168.
See supra Table 3.
See Mithas & Lucas, supra note 87, at 747.
169.
170.
See Jensen, supra note 17, at 1028 ("Our primary and secondary school systems are
increasingly failing to produce the skilled workers needed to utilize fully our ever more
sophisticated and complex stock of intellectual and physical capital . . . .") (quoting
Comprehensive Immigration Reform in 2009; Can We Do It and How?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees & Border Sec. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 10-11 (2009) (statement of Alan Greenspan, former Chairman, Federal Reserve System of
the United States)).
171.
See Mithas & Lucas, supra note 87, at 749.
See supra Table 2.
172.
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equivalent domestic counterparts. While this was not the case in the
technology industry, the equalizing of the two groups from 2003 to
2010 suggests diminished discrimination. Therefore, these statistics
tell a hopeful story that discrimination has subsided for all H-1B
workers.
V. SOLUTION: LESSONS FROM CANADA
To capitalize on the benefits that the H-1B program provides to
the technology industry, the legislature should allot the current
budget of H-1B visas as technology industry-specific visas to the states
in addition to adopting a hybrid system and allowing states to
nominate immigrants for H-1B visas. This solution will work to
benefit both the technology industry and H-1B recipients, as well as
the visa system and each state's technology industry.
A. Set Aside Technology-Specific Visas
As the technology industry is the most frequent user of H-1B
visas, 173 Congress should allow for a sizeable portion of the current
H-1B cap to go towards the technology industry, while creating
different H-1B visa caps for the other industries. By allotting a large
portion of visas to the technology industry, the rest of the H-1B
program will be able to flourish while providing the technology
industry with directed, efficient means to obtain the temporary
high-skilled work they need. Those not in the technology industry will
benefit from reduced competition in the H-1B lottery, which has
historically flooded the H-1B lottery with requests. 174
A large portion of H-1B visas should be allocated to the
technology industry, on the stipulation that each company receiving
the visa follows the Immigration and Nationality Act. Allowing
technology companies to vie for specific visas independent of other
industries will allow for greater self-policing of the potential abuses in
the H-1B system. Technology companies who want to utilize these
visas will act as enforcement mechanisms such that others in the
industry do not jeopardize their opportunity to use the visa, as abuses
of the H-lB process are what Congressional leaders point to when

173.
See Gower, supra note 15, at 244 ("The information technology sector
disproportionately relies on H-1B visas compared to other industries."); see also Ruiz et al., supra
note 16 (reporting that among H-1B applications, computer occupations were the most highly
requested occupation group in all but 11 metros of the 106 high-demand metros).
174.
See Ruiz et al., supra note 16.
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opposing the expansion of the H-1B visa program.' 75 Should H-1B
abuses continue to occur, the expansion of the program may be in
jeopardy.1 76 As a result, technology leaders will be more vigilant and
vocal about opposing H-1B abuses. This will lead to greater
transparency in the visa process and less abuse of the system, which
will benefit the overall H-1B and visa systems.
B. A Hybrid System
Two competing models exist for selecting economic immigrants
nations: points-based and employer-led selection. 77
industrialized
in
A points-based system, as adopted in the United Kingdom and
Denmark, allows immigrants who have a sufficient number of skills
and experiences to enter the country. 78 Employer-based systems, as
seen in the US H-1B process, allow employers to select their workforce
subject to government regulations. 7 9
Many countries, such as
Australia and Canada, have adopted hybrid systems, which balance
the flexibility of point systems while prioritizing employer demand. 8 0
To remain competitive, the United States must shift from their
employer-based selection to a hybrid approach.
In a points-based system, the government controls the flow of
immigrants by requiring immigrants to apply directly to the
government.181 The government selects immigrants by allotting a
number of points to each immigrant quality that they desire:
education, language, and work experience in high-demand occupations
and selecting the immigrants that have the most points. 8 2
The
points-based system allows for flexibility in response to industry
demand, but many immigrants arrive to the host country without a
job offer and some are unable to find work.' 8 3
Recent research

175.
See Patrick Thibodeau, Southern California Edison Layoffs Get U.S. Senate
Attention, IT WORLD (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.itworld.com/article/2881477/southern-californiaedison-layoffs-get-us-senate-attention.html.
176.

See id.

177.
See DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU & MADELINE SUMPTION, MIGRATION POLICY
INST., RETHINKING POINTS SYSTEMS AND EMPLOYER-SELECTED IMMIGRATION 1 (2011), available

at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/rethinking pointssystem.pdf.
178.

See id.

179.
180.
181.

See id.
See id. at 9.
See id. at 2.

182.

See id.

183.

See id. at 3.
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suggests that points-based systems may contribute to "brain-waste" as
they under-employ foreign workers once they enter the country.1 84
In contrast, employer-based systems allow employers to select
the applicants that they wish to employ.18 5 The US H-1B visa system
is a prime example of the advantages and disadvantages of the
employer-based system. 8 6 While foreign workers have little risk of
being unemployed, concerns abound that employers will pay
below-market wages or will contribute to illegal immigration once the
temporary work visa period ends.' 8 1
Hybrid systems combine the best of both the points-based
systems and employer-based systems.1 88 Hybrid systems prioritize
employer demand while using a points test to distinguish between
immigrants, most often used by awarding points for a job offer.1 89
Both Canada and New Zealand have implemented a hybrid system by
utilizing point systems while also allowing some form of
employer-selected immigration.19 0 For instance, Canada uses the
point system but awards up to ten extra points for immigrants who
have a job offer.191 Canada awards up to ten points for arranged
employment, but offers a maximum of twenty-five points for education
and twenty-eight points for language.1 92
The US H-1B visa system should adopt Canada's hybrid
system by awarding points for not only education and language, but
This
also arranged employment, experience, and adaptability.' 9 3
hybrid system for the H-1B visa system will prefer the "best and
brightest" for entry into the country, while prioritizing actual
employer demand by awarding extra points for arranged employment.
The hybrid system will not only once again encourage highly skilled
individuals to apply for an H-1B visa, but will also ensure that the US
technology sector is getting the highly skilled individuals that it
needs.

184.
&

See id. at 4. For recent research on points-based systems, see DEP'T OF IMMIGRATION

CITIZENSHIP,

ADDITIONAL

available
MIGRANTS,
additional-results.pdf.
185.

at

RESULTS

FROM

THE CONTINUOUS

SURVEY

OF

AUSTRALIA'S

http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/research/pdf/csam-

See PAPADEMETRIOU & SUMPTION, supra note 177, at 3.

186.
See id.
187.
See id. at 4.
188.
See id. at 5.
189.
See id. at 5-6.
190.
See id. at 6.
191.
See
Canada
Immigration
Points
Calculator,
WORKPERMIT.COM,
http://www.workpermit.com/canada/points-calculator.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
192.
See id.
193.
See id.
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C. A State-Centric System
After adopting a hybrid system, the United States should also
adopt a state-centric system that allows each state to nominate
immigrants for an H-1B visa. The technology-specific visas should be
allotted to each individual state, based on the demand for H-1B visas
and the population of the state and size of the state's technology
industry. Canada recently adopted the Provincial Nominee Program
(PNP), which allows provinces and territories to nominate immigrants
for visas. 194 While most of the provincial nominees will have to have
an offer of employment, the territory will also have to determine if
each candidate meets their own requirements in an informal
points-based system. 195 This system embodies both the hybrid system
and a state-centric system, and the United States should adopt a
similar program.
Canada's PNP requires immigrants to first apply directly to the
196
After a
province or territory where the immigrant wants to settle.
and
to
Citizenship
apply
then
they
province nominates an immigrant,
Immigration Canada (CIC) to become a permanent resident of
Canada. 197 Each province has special categories that it is interested
in-Ontario will get individuals interested in the Investors
category, 198 while Saskatchewan seeks workers in the Entrepreneur
and Farm category. 199 Each province also has an agreement with the
government allowing them to select a number of immigrants, subject
to regional requirements and needs. 200 Not only is the process more
streamlined for each state to get the workers it needs, but processing
201
under the PNP is faster than any federal immigration program.
The United States should implement a similar program, where
each immigrant directly applies to the state where they are interested
in working. States, like provinces in Canada, will advertise for the
specific industry they are seeking workers in and will nominate

194.
See Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) Immigration, PNP
IMMIGR.,
http://pnpimmigration.com/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
See id.
195.
See Provincial Nominees, GOvT CAN., http://www.cic.gc.ca/englishlimmigrate/
196.
provinciallindex.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
See id.
197.
198.
See Opportunities Ontario Provincial Nominee Program (PNP), CANADAVISA.COM,
(last visited Mar. 17,
http://www.canadavisa.com/ontario-provincial-nominee-program.html
2015).
199.

See

Saskatchewan Immigrant

Nominee

Program (SINP),

CANADAVISA.COM,

(last visited Mar.
http://www.canadavisa.com/saskatchewan-provincial-nominee-program.html
17, 2015).
See ProvincialNominee Program(PNP) Immigration, supra note 194.
200.
201.

See id.
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individuals based on a hybrid system. While in Canada, immigrants
are required to apply for permanent citizenship after a province
nominates them, the United States should maintain a temporary
immigrant status for H-1B workers. 2 02 As implemented in the United
States, this state-centric program will ensure that each state obtains
the workers that it needs.
However, the number of H-1B visas will continue to be subject
to the legislatively mandated caps, rather than each state's agreement
with the government. The DOL should be the regulatory body to fix
the allotment of H-1B visas to the states and should employ expert
statisticians to determine the equitable distribution of visas. The
DOL, the current overseer of the H-lB lottery, not only has a large
amount of institutional knowledge about the H-1B visa process, but
also has a wealth of historical data on the trends for state H-1B
visas. 203 The DOL, not Congress, is in the best position to fairly and
efficiently allocate the budget of technology visas to the states.
Moreover, after the initial allotment is in place, the states
should be allowed to barter with other states to exchange H-lB visas
for other temporary employment visas. Facing pressures from their
own technology industries, states will be in the best position to assess
the labor market in their states and the demand for H-1B visas.
Should the state see more of a need for other types of temporary work
visas-for instance if New York needs additional H-1B visas for
fashion models or if California sees a need for more agricultural
workers-the state should be able to engage in a trade for the types of
visas they need. 204
Free trade of temporary work visas will serve two purposes.
First, it will ensure that H-1B visas are going to those states and
companies that need them the most. By designating states as the
central mechanism for distributing visas, states are free to enact the
policy of distributing visas in a way that will best benefit their
constituency. States will also be in a more proximate position to
monitor each individual company that obtains an H-1B visa and can
take disciplinary matters into their own hands should they detect
H-1B violations, rather than waiting for the DOL to adjudicate the
matter. The distribution of visas within states will be left up to the
state legislatures, who can enact a lottery system or determine

202.
See id.
203.
See H-1B Program,supra note 20.
204.
There are many types of temporary work visas other than H-lB visas. For an
exhaustive list, see Temporary Work Visas, U.S. DEP'T ST., http://travel.state.gov/content/
visas/englishlemployment/temporary.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2015).
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another equitable solution to the excess demand for H-1B visas that
will best serve their residents.
Furthermore, allowing free trade of temporary work visas will
promote economic efficiency by allowing each state to specialize in the
industry that gives them the highest competitive advantage. For
states that are agriculturally minded, the need for H-1B visas may be
at a minimum. However, they can trade their allotted H-1B visas for
agricultural temporary work visas. Both states and society will
benefit from this trade, and each state will be able to specialize in the
industry that gives them the greatest returns. Ultimately, allotting
H-1B visas in proportion to the demands of each state will allow for a
greater chance that a true market equilibrium will occur.
VI. CONCLUSION
H-1B visas are a valuable source of high-skilled labor that
strengthens the US economy and provides a way to avoid labor
shortages in fields that require technical knowledge. The current bill
before the House-the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and
Immigration Modernization Act of 2013-offers little change to the
H-1B process, other than increasing the visa cap. These visas have the
potential to radically improve the immigration system for high-skilled
labor should they be put to their highest use.
Setting aside specific H-1B visas for the technology industry
will not only make the H-1B process fair and effective but will also
benefit both the domestic workers and the foreign workers that will be
working in the technology industry by creating settled expectations
surrounding the probability of obtaining an H-1B visa. Further,
creating a hybrid system that allows each immigrant to apply directly
to the state where they would like to work will ensure that each state
is getting the type of worker that it needs. Finally, by allowing states
to barter with each other for temporary work visas, each state will be
able to specialize in the industry that gives them the highest
competitive advantage.
H-1B reform must be addressed for the sake of the domestic
technology industry. The industry, struggling with labor shortages
and job postings that are not filled by domestic talent, has been
constrained for far too long by the H-1B visa cap. However, increasing
the cap is not enough. Engaging in steps, such as a hybrid system,
that will meaningfully change the way that highly skilled immigrants
apply for H-1B visas is a necessary step towards meaningful
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immigration reform.
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